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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
This article attempts to broaden the analytical framework of the EU security 
policy literature. The wider aim is to provide a conceptual link between the 
engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), crisis resolution and 
post-conflict peace-building in general. I develop a context specific analysis of the 
EU’s role in the DRC, while enabling the extrapolation of generalisable findings 
concerning peacebuilding and security sector reform. The EU, with particular 
importance placed on its civilian ESDP missions, has staked out a role of 
coordinator within the heterarchy of international donor involvement. In line with 
the new international consensus, the EU employs its missions as vehicles to 
advance reforms in support of peace by focusing on a multidimensional approach 
and micro-engagement in the processes of reform along lines of European ‘best 
practice’. It will be argued that this involvement represents a new ‘civilising’ 
approach to peacebuilding based on central notions of international neo-
trusteeship. This approach adds important value to the international community’s 
effort to resolve violent conflict, by advancing the peace building agenda 
conceptually and providing much needed reference points for the wider donor 
community within the increasingly crowded space of international peacebuilding.  
 
Key words: European Union, peacebuilding, civilian ESDP missions, 
security sector reform, neo-trusteeship 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The Framework of the Study 
 
 
1.1.1 Building Peace  
 
A number of recent studies have pointed to the bad track record of the 
international community’s efforts to end violent conflict. A recent United Nations 
(UN) report estimates that roughly 60 per cent of all peace missions have a chance 
at succeeding after the signing of peace agreements; in Africa this figure falls to 
40 per cent (2004b, p.14). Preventing “a relapse into conflict”, to borrow from 
Boutros-Ghali’s landmark Agenda for Peace, is the “essential goal” of the 
international community’s efforts (1992).  
The international communities own frustration with this mixed success rate is 
further evidenced by comments made by the UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Peace-keeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who remarked, that the approach remains 
“far from perfect” and “as a result, we have peacekeeping operations that succeed, 
only to lapse back into conflict. Successful operations, as it were, in which the 
patient dies” (2005). 
The establishment of stable and self-sustainable peace anywhere depends on a 
number of important reforms that have to be tackled to prevent the reoccurrence 
of war. Amongst the various lessons learnt, that where identified over the years 
chief amongst them is the need to combine the work on security and stabilisation 
with the work on governance and development in an integrated strategic vision. 
This is what Boutros-Ghali referred to as to “the creation of structures for the 
institutionalization of peace” (UN 1995). 
Peace-building as a concept then is of more recent origin. It defines activities 
undertaken on the far side of conflicts to reassemble the foundations of peace and 
provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than 
just the absence of war. It is conceptualised as a post-conflict process, or set of 
activities that aim to tackle the root causes of conflict, such as disarmament and 
demobilisation, election monitoring, and reforming or strengthening 
governmental institutions. Peace-building therefore includes strong elements of 
state-building, with a central concern resting on notions of good governance 
(Gueli et al 2006). 
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Particular focus has increasingly rested on the use of civilian components 
(including civilian police) in order to address essential non-military tasks, 
including political transition, governance and democratisation, rule of law, human 
rights, justice, reconciliation and reconstruction, and socio-economic 
development. This type of approach has recently become known under the 
heading complex peace operation. 
This approach as it has been developed by the UN over the last decade or so, 
has been largely focused on the systemic nature of conflict, and by extension has 
employed a focus that is largely premised on systems. It is all too clear that often 
the people behind the façade of government are the real problem and that enabling 
the establishment of systemic structures, such as oversight bodies for effective 
auditing mechanisms have been largely welcomed as important tools of building 
sustainable peace. These investments have been crucial, but to quote from the 
Financial Times “systems are good – but if the people in the system are corrupt, 
you haven’t got very far” (Stearns & Wong 2006) 
 
1.1.2 Evolution of the European Approach to Conflict Resolution 
 
Since 2003, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has entered into 
the limelight in a number of conflict areas – in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since then, ESDP 
missions have considerably diversified in terms of geography (17 Operations in 
three years in three continents), quantity (around 10000 persons have served 
under the Union’s banner (Steinmeier 2007)) and quality.  
The conceptual range of these missions is impressive ranging from traditional 
military peace support1 and ceasefire monitoring operations2 to the deployment of 
civilian police forces3, border control4 and assistance to security sector reform5 
and the development of state judicial systems6 (Council 2007a). 
Even if the majority of these civil-military operations were case-by-case 
demands by the UN or third states, the multitude of different activities the Union 
has engaged in terms of ESDP since 2003 exhibit a multi-dimensional presence as 
envisaged in the European Security Strategy: 
                                                 
1 EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (since 2004) and EU Support for AMIS-II in Darfur (since 2005) are 
still ongoing. Two missions in the DRC, Operation Artemis (2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) 
are completed. 
2 Operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003) and the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia (2005-
2006). 
3 EU Police Mission in Bosnia (since 2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (since 2005), EUPOL COPPS in 
the Palestinian Territories (since 2005) and EUPOL Proxima and later the EU Police Advisory 
Team in Macedonia (2003-2006). 
4 EU Border Assistance Mission at the Border Crossing in Rafah between the Gaza Strip and 
Egypt (since 2005), and a Mission on the Moldova-Ukraine Border (since 2005). 
5 EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Sector Reform in the DRC, or ‘EUSEC RD 
Congo’ (since 2005) 
6 EU Rule of Law Missions in Iraq (since 2005) and in Georgia (2004-2005) 
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“The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: 
European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund (EDF), 
military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments […] 
Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the 
same agenda. […] Greater coherence is needed not only among the European 
Unions (EU) instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual 
member states” (European Council 2003:14). 
An increasing number of EU policy statements have enshrined a commitment 
to broadening conflict prevention and resolution policies. These are to incorporate 
issues that are seen as intricately linked to the related political and economic 
causes of conflict. As far back as the mid-1990s, the Commission (1996) 
introduced the concept of structural stability as a political benchmark for EU 
engagement in African conflicts. This was further emphasised in 2001, 
committing the EU to elaborate indicators of good governance and rule of law, all 
of which were to be reflected in aid programmes and other “crisis related 
activities” (Commission 2001). Subsequently the Commission (2002) identified a 
checklist for root causes of conflict that included an extensive range of factors. All 
in all the strategy for conflict management is increasingly shaping up to be, in the 
words of former Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Poul 
Nielson, “not just about peace and conflict management, it is also about laying the 
foundation for society to function, creating the minimum conditions for 
governance and stability” (cited in Commission 2003:6). 
With the ESDP, the EU endowed itself with a value-oriented international 
security policy that privileges peace support operation over war fighting. It 
balances limited but increasingly robust military capabilities to enforce and keep 
the peace in conflict-prone or war-torn countries with strong civilian capabilities 
to assist countries in building stable peace (Merlingen & Ostrauskaité 2006:2). 
This represents significantly more than a vehicle to further narrow European 
security interests. It is an expression of the EU’s international mission for 
humanity. 
 
 
1.2 The Subject of the Study 
 
 
1.2.1 The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Three countries have been afforded particular focus by the Unions new crisis 
transformation capabilities: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the DRC. In the 
first two cases, the Union’s objective and interests are easily identifiable. Due to 
the geographical proximity of the Western Balkans to the Union proper, both 
countries stability is fundamentally and directly important to the security of the 
EU and its member states. The Union is hence increasingly committed to the 
stabilisation and progressive ‘adhesion’ of the region and these countries in 
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particular. This kind of rationality certainly will apply to the Kosovo as well once 
the Union takes over the responsibility in this troubled region.  
In its efforts to develop a more effective and coherent international profile, the 
EU has accorded major importance to its incipient conflict resolution strategies 
for Africa. In this regard, an area of particularly visible Union activity has been 
the Great Lakes region and the DRC in particular. Concerning the DRC then, the 
above security motivation is weak, especially when weighed against the potential 
risks of engagement in this area. The size and complexity of its problems, which 
shall be explained in more detail below, make any outside involvement uncertain 
at best. Moreover, even with all the horror the DRC has and continues to 
experience, the strategic reason for the Union to engage remains, on the face of it, 
unsure – especially if weighed against the more cautious approach the Union took 
in its other deployments.  
Yet, as I will argue, it is precisely theses challenges that represent the biggest 
opportunity for the Union. It can display and develop its unique ability in the 
realm of conflict resolution, in an area where international community is involved 
but significant political room for manoeuvre and, potentially, leadership remains. 
 
1.2.2 Aim and Hypotheses 
 
Since 2002 the EU has been involved in a myriad of activities aimed at 
stabilising the country and building the peace that address the mission gap, as it 
were, between security and development: effective and sustainable security sector 
reform, the promotion of good governance and development. Much of the media 
and academic attention has focused on the EU’s military engagement in the 
Congo. Both Operation Artemis in Bunia, and EUFOR DR Congo in Kinshasa 
have attracted considerable attention. I aim to make a contribution to this growing 
literature by highlighting particularly the valuable contributions made by the 
Unions small civilian ESDP missions, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo. 
This thesis concerns itself with the Union’s engagement in this respect in the 
DRC, in order to develop the central tenets of my hypotheses:  
• that the EU approach to conflict resolution is a distinctively new 
adaptation of an approach that has been developed over the last decade or so, 
drawing on the lessons-learnt of peacekeeping and peacebuilding experience; 
• that it is characterised by multidimensionality and micro-engagement in 
the processes of post-conflict transformation and finally;  
• that this approach offers to add important value to the international 
community’s efforts to resolve violent conflicts, in particular in Africa and the 
DRC. 
The thesis will focus on context specific analysis, closely analysing what is 
going on in the DRC, while providing or a wider generalisable conceptual 
analysis. The wider aim is to provide a conceptual link between the engagement 
in the DRC, the general crisis resolution and post-conflict peace-building strategy 
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and the role of the Union within the wider efforts of the international community. 
Thereby I aim to make a small contribution to a growing literature on European 
conflict-management policies, by bringing into focus the case of involvement in 
the DRC and the opportunity for insightful analysis it offers.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
Having already given an introduction to the development of the ideas of 
peacebuilding in general and the emerging European consensus in particular, 
Chapter 2 will give a brief overview of the history of the crisis in the Congo. This 
approach helps the conceptualisation and ‘putting in perspective’ of the problems 
faced by the Democratic Republic in order to emphasising how far this country 
has come since the horrors of the First (1996-97) and Second Congolese War 
(1998-2003). Furthermore, the chapter will also highlight the multi-dimensional 
characteristics of the involvement by the international community. Particular 
focus will be afforded to the structures of governance that have developed 
amongst donors, in order to further establish the idea of what is referred to as a 
heterarchy of organisation. In this situation the EU and particularly its civilian 
ESDP missions have staked out an important role within the wider international 
community. 
Chapter 3, then, will explicitly focus on the role the EU plays within the 
DRC’s transition from violent-conflict to self-sustainable peace. Realising, of 
course, that the Union is involved in the DRC in many other ways as well, 
particular attention will be on the civilian aspects of ESDP. The reasons for doing 
so are, in my mind, both conceptually and empirically compelling.  
As has already been said above, the international donor community, notably 
the UN during the 1990s, identified governance reforms in post-conflict societies 
as a principal element in the construction of an order of liberal peace. In line with 
this new international (read Western) consensus, the EU views its civilian 
missions as vehicles to advance reforms in support of peace in target countries 
through the dissemination of ‘best European practices’. With regard to the DRC 
therefore, the Union’s police and security sector reform mission will be 
exonerated. In this respect the concept micro-engagement will be introduced in 
order to help the conceptualisation of the value the Union adds to the international 
community’s peace-building capabilities. 
Lastly, by way of Conclusion, Chapter 4 will deal with a number of issues that 
arise from the above reading of the ‘new’ role of the EU. 
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2 Crisis in the Congo 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Complex Emergency in the Congo 
 
 
“Since the end of the Cold War traditional peace-keeping has often had to combine 
with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-
State conflict. Those conflict settings, however, both affect and are affected by 
outside actors; political patrons, arms vendors, buyers of illicit commodity exports, 
regional powers that send their own forces into the fray. With such significant cross-
border effects by state and non-state actors alike, these conflicts are often decidedly 
transnational in character” (UN 2000). 
 
The crisis in the Congo, in many ways, represented the archetype of this ‘new’ 
violent conflict. The sheer size, complexity, multidimensionality and 
transnationality of the conflict makes it, sarcastically speaking, the poster-child of 
the flip side of a new globalised world order that is first and foremost defined by 
anarchical features. “From war to disease to poverty to bad governance, Congo is 
a prime example of all of Africa’s nightmares” (International Herald Tribune 
2005). It is estimated that between 1998 and 2004, four million people have died, 
and even today the conflict claims the lives of about 1,200 people a day (Goghlan 
et al 2006).  
 
2.1.1 A short history of Africa’s World War 
 
Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the Congo between 1965 and 
1997. He systematically used Congo’s mineral wealth to consolidate power, to co-
opt potential rivals, and to enrich himself and his allies through an expansive 
system of patronage, thereby turning Zaire, as it was then called, effectively into a 
kleptocracy.7 With the end of the Cold War, the suspension of international 
economic aid and the global collapse of raw commodity prices at the end of the 
1980s, Mobutu began to lose his grip on power. Under strong international 
pressure to democratise, he reluctantly agreed to restore multiparty politics and 
hold national elections in 1991. 
Following the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, Mobutu attempted to regain 
international support by providing shelter to the two million Rwandan refugees 
                                                 
7 “rule by thieves” - the term was essentially invented to adequately describe Mobutu’s rule (cf. 
McEvedy 1996) 
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that had fled to the eastern Congo. He effectively sided with the remnants of the 
Hutu Power génocidaires. In July 1996, he lost the resultant war with Rwanda, 
Uganda as well as rebels of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo, or AFDL. Mobutu was ousted from power in 1997 as 
AFDL leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila took over the country. 
Subsequently Rwanda and Uganda exerted a vice-like grip on their former 
allies, effectively controlling the Kinshasa government. Kabila turned against his 
erstwhile backers in August 1998 in an attempt to role back the influence of these 
regional powers in the Congo. In response, a rebel group called the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) invaded the Congo from 
the east backed by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, taking control of the Kivus and 
the diamond rich town of Mbuji-Mayi and Katanga, the economic lifeline of the 
country. Other rebel militia groups began to appear, including the Ugandan-
backed Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, 
which took Oriental province and Equateur. The speed of the rebel advance was 
facilitated by the desperate state of the Congolese national army, which had 
already proved to be Mobutu’s downfall. Kabila called on Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia for help and with their military support managed to stop the invasion, 
cutting the country through Equateur, the Kasais, and Katanga effectively into 
two (see Map of the Congo). 
In July 1999, a ceasefire agreement was reached, signed in Lusaka, Zambia. Its 
main parts, disarmament of foreign armed groups, withdrawal of foreign troops 
and the convening of an inter-Congolese dialogue however failed to be 
implemented and fighting continued until in early 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
was assassinated by his bodyguard and was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila in 
a seamless transition.8 
Peace negotiations were re-launched and by the end of 2002, the Angolan, 
Zimbabwean, Rwandan and Ugandan troops had fully withdrawn from the DRC. 
In late 2002, all Congolese belligerents, civil society groups and the unarmed 
opposition signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, also known as the Sun 
City Agreement, in Pretoria, South Africa. 
Characteristic for the later stages of the war was an increasing splintering into 
sub-groups on all sides. Commanders of the Congolese armed forces broke away 
and created their own militias, rebel groups split and changed sides, former allies 
compete for power and turned on each other, turning what was first a ‘simple’ 
‘rebel versus government’ war into an all-out ‘everyone against everyone and for 
their own benefit’.9 Although, due to their rather ‘fluid’ nature their numbers are 
hard to establish exactly it is estimated that around 20 different rebel groups and 
                                                 
8 The murder was never solved completely and rumours of western involvement continue to 
abound. Especially the smooth transfer of power suggest a carefully executed coup d’état. 
9 For example, tensions between Uganda and Rwanda in 1999 over access to diamonds and other 
valuable recourses led to a fracturing of their protégée, the RCD onto a Goma-based (RCD-G) and 
Kisangani-based (RCD-K) sub-unit. The latter allied itself with Ugandan-backed MLC. Other 
breakaway factions of the RCD are RCD-National, RCD-Congo and RCD-Mouvement de 
Liberation.  
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militias have fought in the Congo on top of the already mentioned six national 
armies.  
 
2.1.2 The current situation 
 
After more than three years of transition, the peace process remains at risk. 
Following the successful presidential, national and provincial assembly election, 
President Joseph Kabila was inaugurated on 6 December 2006, bringing the 
transition process that was envisaged by the Sun City Agreement of 2002 
formally to an end.  
The new government has weak and barely functioning institutions. Significant 
internal political challenges remain, chief among them the problematic 
relationship with Jean-Pierre Bemba, the opponent of Kabila during the 
Presidential elections and leader of the parliamentary opposition.  
The main reason for the impasse has been the reluctance of the former 
belligerents to give up power and assets for the national good. They have 
maintained parallel command structures in the army, the local administration and 
the intelligence services. Both leaders, themselves former rebel leaders, continue 
to have hundreds of armed personal guards stationed in Kinshasa, which engage 
in periodic fighting. During the run up to the elections the EU’s military force, 
EUFOR, had to intervene to stop the violence (BBC 2006). 
The Governments limited law enforcement capacity to deal with such unrest is 
further undermined by the poor discipline of some of the national police and army 
personnel, who often respond to unrest with disproportionate use of force and, as 
in the case of unrest in the Bas-Congo province in late January 2007 with 
summary executions.10 
The logic of the Sun City agreement has brought the problems of governance 
into sharp relief. State resources were siphoned off to fund election campaigns 
and private accounts as senior positions in the administration and state-run 
enterprises were shared between signatories. It is estimated that between 60 and 
80 per cent of customs revenues were embezzled, a quarter of the national budget 
is not properly accounted for, and millions of dollars are misappropriated in the 
army and state-run companies. The mining sector is particularly prone to 
corruption, with valuable concessions granted with little legitimate benefit to the 
state (ICG 2006b). 
Furthermore, aided by the weakness of the central government, local conflict is 
still ongoing in the eastern provinces. Rebel groups, including dissident members 
of former rebel movements and untamed militias, continue to fight the 
government and local rivals. Over 800,000 internally displaced Congolese have 
                                                 
10 In Bas-Congo, serious incidents of civil unrest on 31 January and 1 February between Bundu 
Dia Kongo, a politico-religious movement, and the Congolese security forces resulted in the death 
of over 100 people, mainly civilians. Precipitating these events had been allegations of corrupt 
practices in relation to the distribution of Provincial Assembly seats (cf. UN 2007) 
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yet to return to their homes because of the high levels of violence and instability 
(enough 2007). 
As a result, the UN identifies the effective retraining and reintegration of all 
old-ex-combatants in the DRC,11 the professionalisation of Armed Forces of the 
DRC (FARDC) and the Congolese national police as “preconditions for long-term 
stability” in the DRC (UN 2007). 
 
 
2.2 Mapping Donor Involvement in the Transition 
 
 
2.2.1 Multi-Party Involvement 
 
When choosing a particular actor, in this case the EU, and analysing what it is 
or is not doing concerning the crisis in the DRC, it is easy either to overstate the 
role it plays or to be overly critical of its deficiencies in the face of the enormous 
challenges at hand. The truth, whatever it may be, of course, always has to be 
mediated against the backdrop of feasibility and reality. That is to say, it is easy to 
suggest that, say the Union’s efforts in peacemaking in the eastern part of the 
country in 2003, through Operation Artemis in Bunia, where “farcically modest” 
and “extremely narrow in scope” (Youngs 2004: 318). Without wanting to 
disagree totally with this analysis or to get into too detailed a discussion of the 
merits of the mission, it is undeniably important to look at the big-picture and 
remember that the primary responsibility for security in the east rests with the UN 
Mission in the Congo (MONUC), not the EU. 
MONUC is by far the most important international actor on the ground. It 
consists of 18,000 uniformed personnel, including 16,500 troops, 700 military 
observers and 1000 civilian police. Furthermore, it has a vast mandate. On the one 
hand it is asked to “assist” and “facilitate” the reform of the security sector, the re-
establishment of a State based on the rule of law. This includes the delivery of 
civil police protection, promotion of human rights, advice and assistance to the 
transitional government and investigating illegal weapons smuggling, especially 
with regards to the widely available Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). On 
the other hand, within the eastern part of the DRC, especially in the Ituri district 
and the Kivus, the mission is asked to pursue forceful military campaigns to 
pacify these troublesome regions. These military tasks include monitoring of the 
ceasefire, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, and war 
fighting against renegade militias (UN 2004a) 
What this show’s is that, as engaged or not the EU may be in the conflict, it is 
by no means the only actor involved, and a good deal of sharing of 
                                                 
11 This process is referred to as brassage. It in effect provides an avenue to turn the old Armed 
Forces of the Congo (FAC) into a new Army (FARDC), by integrating them with elements of the 
former rebel movements, as stipulated by the Sun City Agreement. 
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responsibilities has to be take into account. Indeed, it is evident that this is the 
basis, or should be, of the involvement of the international community in the 
conflict. Moreover, the nature of this involvement is, in the case of the DRC, 
multifaceted with a large number of independent, external actors. 
The situation on the ground is hence characterised by heterarchy12 with a 
multiplication of actors involved in the post-conflict transition: the UN and its 
various agencies as the most experienced actors and primary security provider, the 
World Bank, bilateral contributors from the region, such as South Africa and 
Angola, the EU, a variety of Non-Governmental Organisations, or NGOs, and last 
but not least, of course the Government of the DRC under Joseph Kabila. Indeed 
several European member states have their own programmes running alongside 
the EU’s engagement. Most prominent amongst these is the Congo’s former 
colonial power Belgium, which is involved in the training of the First Integrated 
Brigade of the FARDC. Furthermore, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Sweden all have their own programmes, mostly (financially) 
supporting South African led army reintegration efforts.  
Of course, Congolese history suggests that the role of government was never 
much pronounced as a central, singular and unifying force within the state 
security and regulatory architecture. The situation was always much more one of 
competing, virtually autonomous security agents, ranging from different parts of 
the armed forces, the police, traditional local self-defence forces such as the 
Mayi-Mayi13 and various militia groups committed to the overthrow of the 
Kinshasa government and control of the countries rich natural resources. 
To conceptualise this cacophony of actors, it is useful to apply the concept of 
governance in order to elucidate the character of post-conflict engagement in the 
various ‘building-sites’ that is the state of the DRC. Borrowing from Webber et 
al, governance in this instance is defined as involving “the coordinated 
management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the 
intervention of both public and private actors, […] formal and informal 
arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully 
directed toward particular policy outcomes” (Webber et al 2004:4). In this case, 
self-sustainable peace and development in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. 
The meaning of ‘coordinated management’ is in this respect premised on a 
different, ideational congruence, which can be said to exist amongst the majority 
of actors. When looking at policy papers from the various agencies and actors, all 
exhibit similar assessments of the present situation and draw similar conclusions 
from them as to what needs to be done. Politically, that is; ‘in theatre’, to borrow 
from military jargon here, things often look entirely different as to the 
cohesiveness of multi-donor involvement.  
Coordination on the ground is of course the primary problematique in this 
respect. I do not pretend that the actions of the various actors in the transition are 
                                                 
12 Heterarchy refers to forms of coordinated behaviour that are distinct from anarchy or hierarchy 
(vertical authority). In essence, it is used here, to mean, ‘multiple governance structures without 
hierarchy’. 
13 For an explanatory article about the history and evolution of the Mayi-Mayi see IRIN (2006) 
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always properly coordinated so as to avoid duplication and contradictions. Far 
from it, evidence unfortunately exists to the contrary. For example, when Western 
donors initially established the Great Lakes Contact Group, this was a tacit 
indication of the weakness of existing coordination structures and the need for 
more donor unity in dealing with the Congolese. The poorly coordinated donors 
had routinely allowed Congolese politicians to play them off against each other 
for their own gains. This had resulted in multiple initiatives, carried out ad hoc 
and in isolation of each other. Everyone, as it were, was working “in their own 
corner” (ICG 2006a:27). 
 
 The institutional structure of donor coordination 
 
Ideational congruence is in part fostered by the existence of a number of fora 
through which international donors and the various agencies involved 
communicate. In varying set-ups and with varying foci, these fora stimulate a 
certain amount of ‘group think’ about the issues at hand. There are a number of 
these fora that should be highlighted at this point, that provide important input for 
the coordination on the ground, which is fundamentally important for the success 
of the transition.  
First and foremost, the International Committee for the Support of the 
Transition (CIAT) was tasked with overseeing the transitional process mandated 
by the Global All-Inclusive Agreement and includes an important Security Sector 
Reform Coordination Sub-committee.14 As the main coordinating forum it was 
extremely important pressuring the international community “to harmonise its 
political and economic strategies by carefully calibrating its political goals and 
financial and material assistance as a means of encouraging the DRC’s authorities 
to move the transitional process forward” (UN 2004c) With the successful 
holding of elections in November 2006, CIAT has been dissolved. Discussions on 
a follow-on structure to coordinate donor support are ongoing but a new 
international structure to support the peace process seems all but certain (see 
MONUC 2006; Crisis Group 2007). The Government of Joseph Kabila and some 
donors appear to want to replace CIAT with a purely technical structure 
concentrated on development and humanitarian assistance and to treat most aid 
and security sector reform support on a bilateral basis. As the International Crisis 
Group notes, “this would weaken the capacity of the international community to 
work collectively to support democratic practices and safeguard other peace 
process achievements” (2007:1). In response the EU, UN and the World Bank 
have drafted a concept paper proposing to create an enlarged donors group that 
would both coordinate aid and discuss political affairs.15  
                                                 
14 Chaired by MONUC, its membership was made up of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council (P-5), Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Zambia as well as the African Union (AU) and the EU, both represented by their respective 
Commissions and Presidencies. 
15 The Governance Compact as the paper is based on the political dialogue envisaged by Art 8 of 
the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.  
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Other important international and regional fora include, inter alia, the Great 
Lakes Contact Group16 and the Tripartite Plus One Commission 17. On top of that 
a wide variety of other fora exist that debate and deal with the DRC transition 
amongst other things. These include the UN Security Council, the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), the World Bank and its Multi-Country Demobilisation 
and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the various UN agencies. All are 
actors in their own right while at the same time they also represent ways and 
avenues through which cooperation and engagement in the DRC’s transition is 
structured and informed. 
It is hence possible to speak of a governance of the transition, meaning that the 
regulation of Congolese society and state has been supplemented by the roles of 
political actors, such as the UN, the EU, NGOs etc, alongside the traditional role 
of the government. This heterarchy of organisation (Jessop 1999, op cit) is 
consequently characterised by a “modicum of order and routinised arrangements” 
(Rosenau 2000:7) that transcends the traditional overarching governmental 
authority.  
In many ways, therefore, this governance of the transition lacks a former 
system of rule, unlike for example in the EU which is often described as a system 
of governance itself, albeit with different connotations. Yet, it is not dependent on 
vertical authority meaning that “in the absence of compulsion, collective action, 
while facilitated by institutional mechanisms, remains dependent in the first 
instance upon a willingness to act and a consistency of view on a desirable end 
state” (Webber et al 2004:7). Both, at this point, can be said to exist amongst the 
international community and, at least, central parts of the Kinshasa Government. 
 
2.2.3 Governing Heterarchy: The EU’s Moment 
 
In the Congo, or any country in transition from violent-conflict to peace, the 
absence of an overarching political authority that controls the process of peace-
building has alarmed a number of scholars and practitioners as to its inability to 
effectively channel and ‘bring under one umbrella’ international assistance to the 
transition (cf. Jones 2002; Paris 2004). 
Commenting on the UN’s role in former Yugoslavia, Minear et al (1994) 
noted, that “the United Nations did not respond as a system but rather as a series 
of separate and largely autonomous agencies. Each had its own institutional 
dynamics, formulated its own priorities, and moved according to a timetable of its 
own devising.” Under such a system peacebuilding efforts suffer from overlaps 
and conflict in the activities of the various agencies. Indeed the UN’s own 
                                                 
16 Includes Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, Angola, 
South Africa and the EU, which is represented EUSR Ajello, the European Commission and 
members of EUSEC RD Congo. MONUC and the World Bank act as observers. 
17 The Tripartite Commission brings together Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan and, later, 
Burundian leaders. 
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Brahimi Report acknowledged this fact by calling for a “focal point for 
peacebuilding activities” (2000:8). 
The same analysis can without doubt be transferred to the situation in post-
conflict DRC to describe not only the UN system but the whole of the heterarchy 
of actors. Yet, while the UN’s own recommendation for alleviating this 
problematique point to a technical-organisational adjustment of the UN system, 
there remains in the meantime significant scope for ideational leadership. In other 
words, while the systemic arrangements for a single-headed semi-hierarchical 
structure, grounded in international law are not available the need remains to 
make the best out of the current situation. Even without the sufficient 
organisational enhancements, along the lines of a central international agency18 to 
provide for an integrated approach, work must continue.  
The kind of fluid governance without clear hierarchical or institutional 
frameworks that has been sketched above may well prove to be in the EU’s 
advantage in the meantime. In search of a second-best strategy a number of actors 
have to take the lead practically as a reference point for the other actors, so as to 
provide the necessary integrated guidance that is required. This is best achieved 
by leading by good example. 
Referring back to the above example of lack of donor coordination in the Great 
Lakes Contact Group, a turning point came with the arrival of the EU Security 
Sector Reform Mission, or EUSEC RD Congo. Donors were thereafter able to 
coordinate effectively with the Congolese institutions. This is partly due to the 
fact that EUSEC has been very effective in liaising with ‘the right people’. 
“EUSEC owes much of its success to its style, including use of informal and 
friendly breakfast briefings among a handful of experts” (ICG 2006a:28); ‘the 
right people, in the right way’, on might add. 
Regular networking, that number one European speciality, and cooperation 
with, amongst others, the ministry of defence, the National Commission for 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (CONADER) and the Maison militaire19 of 
Joseph Kabila has, as the ICG notes, allowed “the development of a more 
cohesive view across the multiple bodies involved in the […] process” 
(2006a:19).  
This example shows that in heterarchical situations authority and effective 
guidance is determined by function, knowledge and skill. Post-conflict situations 
are always going to be, as we have seen above, an exercise in what we may call 
simultaneous engineering. This means that different national and international 
actors develop their programmes concurrently, with a view to a similar goal 
(security sector reform). There have to be, hence, ongoing efforts to fine tune ones 
                                                 
18 the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed the establishment of a 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as a new intergovernmental body at the UN. The PBC will be 
responsible for addressing a critical gap within the UN by providing a coordinated, coherent and 
integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue amongst key actors. 
 
19 The Maison is the presidential military office. General Kalume, one of its members regularly 
attends EUSEC meetings. 
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own projects with a view of all the other project in order to avoid overlaps and 
conflicts.  
The EU civilian missions that will be detailed in the next chapter, have 
provided one important and in many ways invaluable reference system for the 
whole of the international community, thereby fulfilling an important functional 
role. As the British House of Lord noted the mission is “widely regarded as being 
effective not only in the delivery of support, but also as a means of co-ordinating 
the international community’s efforts” (2006:15). It is in this light that comments 
by the ICG have to be see, when it suggested an International Military and 
Training Assistance Team to be established on the “good basis” provided by an 
“expanded EUSEC mission” (2006a:20). EU civilian mission provide in a sense a 
central register against which to evaluate other efforts, while at the same time 
leaving a door open to innovative mission designs and lessons-learnt from other 
actors with the process.  
The ‘Europeans’, as it were, have hence been able to cleverly stake out a 
position as central reference point within the donor-locals coordination ‘jungle’. 
In large part, this is due to effective liaison, micro-engagement in the processes of 
governance reform and the professionalism of its staff. When assessing the 
contribution of the EU to the DRC’s post-conflict transition, within the wider 
efforts of the international community, this kind of functional guidance should be 
kept in mind – it forms an important part of the EU’s ‘added value’. The other 
more substantial characteristics of the EU’s civilian ESDP engagement – 
knowledge and skill – will be treated in the next chapter. 
 20
3 EU and the Transition 
 
 
 
 
 
 The EU’s Conceptual Base of Involvement 
 
 
Peace-building in such a precarious situation as in the DRC, is essentially an 
exercise in state-building. This means, on the one hand, that where there are no 
effective state structures to deal with the many problems the country faces, new 
ones will have to be created to oversee the ‘emergence’ out of the darkness of 
non-governability. On the other hand, it also means involving the EU in existing 
societal-power structures in order to mould them according to international ‘best 
practices’. Such is the role of the EU in the Congo. 
There existed a different kind of order before; most notably complex 
emergency and crisis, laced with non-western, traditional and local notions of 
power and legitimacy. Embodying the Union’s mission for humanity, it’s 
different forms of engagement address themselves, in varying degrees, to the 
improvement of the conduct and subjectivity of judges, prosecutors, police 
officers and public administrators. They thereby project a particular kind of order, 
namely a western and European inspired one.  
As Merlingen and Ostrauskaité (2006) have noted in their authoritative 
analysis of the Union’s “intrusive will to improve” with regards to peace-building 
and police aid, there are three interrelated discourses that inform this messianic 
behaviour. To begin with, there is the new aid consensus founded upon the new 
relationship between development and security. It has been noted from many 
quarters that there cannot be sustainable development in situations of pervasive 
and chronic insecurity and hence the root causes of conflict have to be addressed 
before self-sustained development can take place (cf. Commission 1996; OECD 
1997). Secondly, the emergence of violence-prone societies to effective and self-
sustaining development is hampered by the existence of ‘a regressive 
developmental malaise’ characterised by illiberal and often corrupt or 
criminalised economies and state structure (Duffield 2005). Thirdly, the “new 
humanitarian consensus” (Merlingen & Ostrauskaité 2006:50) that emerged since 
the end of the Cold War, again pushed the EU in a certain direction. Stating the 
belief that there is a link between human rights and peace, especially with 
reference to ethnicity and identity based wars, “human rights and humanitarian 
violations lie at the heart of many conflicts” (SG/HR & Commission 2000:8). 
A failure to address these three relationships threatens any advances in the 
direction of self-sustained development and a reduction of violence. This thinking 
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has led to an erosion of the distinction between development and security, 
meaning that on the one hand, development aid has become more politicised and 
security policy has become broader in perspective. As the ‘Reflection Paper of the 
Portuguese Presidency on EU-African relations’ stated: “Being realistic about 
development means thinking in an integrated manner about politics, security, 
trade as well as development aid itself” (Cardoso et al 2000:12). This shows the 
extent to which development policy has been subsumed into a wider strategy of 
political involvement in Africa and is being rethought in ways that were 
previously unheard of. As Javier Solana emphasised the new role of the aid 
programme was to support “a more effective foreign and security policy […] with 
the political will to use all the available instruments in a co-ordinated and 
coherent way” (2000). 
All three modes of thinking have enabled the legitimisation of EU 
interventions, and especially through the use of civilian missions under ESDP, 
stressing the argument that liberal, democratic government are the foundation of 
sustainable peace. Hence, to transform cultures of impunity and violence in line 
with best European practices, and therefore to exert massive intrusion into 
traditional or non-western societies is supported as a way out of misery, violence, 
poverty and underdevelopment. All the while, it empowers the EU to plan, 
organise and conduct operations that aim at reordering violent societies and 
enabling a ‘transition’. 
Before turning to the EU’s and especially ESDP’s various missions in the 
country it is helpful to elaborate this conceptual approach further. All of these 
interventions reach deep into the ‘objects for improvement’ and the Congolese 
society. This sort of micro-engagement is vitally important to the Union’s 
approach, not only to its peace-building in the DRC, but also to its own specific 
‘value-adding role’ with the wider international communities engagement in 
global order and peaceful emergence. As I will show, these interventions aim at 
the organised adaptation of certain facets or indigenous life in a way so that life 
becomes something other than what it was. Therefore, the armed forces, police, 
courts, judges, the whole security sector apparatus, are reorganised and reordered. 
 
 
 The Strength of Civilian ESDP Missions 
 
 
 The Banality of Micro-Engagement 
 
Robert Kagan (2002) takes the view that “Europe’s strategic culture today places 
less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power 
tools […] because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong.” Equating 
the use of soft-power tools with weakness is as easy as it is deficient in its 
analysis. More nuanced, maybe, a lot of the policy-oriented literature on European 
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security often blows into a similar horn, suggesting that the lack of forceful means 
available to civilian ESDP missions is the main reason for apparent inability of 
missions to effect change upon their host societies (Crisis Group 2005). As has 
been alluded to above, the focus will now turn to such civilian missions of the 
ESDP in the DRC – partly to disprove the apparent ‘truth’ of such arguments. 
I challenge the commonsensical view that civilian ESDP missions are ‘weak’ 
because they often lack an enforcement mandate, are comparatively small-scale 
operations and lack the means to use big sticks and juicy carrots to affect reform 
in the security sector. The EU’s two civilian missions in the DRC – the Advisory 
and Assistance Mission (EUSEC RD Congo) and Police Mission (EUPOL 
Kinshasa) – fulfil all of these apparent deficiencies. Neither has an enforcement 
mandate, focusing instead on “monitoring, mentoring and advising” the 
Congolese authorities (cf. Council 2004; 2005a). Furthermore, both are limited in 
size, EUSEC consisting of eight seconded experts, EUPOL employing about 30 
persons (Council 2005b). Yet as will be shown, both missions are very effective 
in refashioning, repositioning and reorganising their respective domains of the 
security sector. Of course the “will to improve” (Rose 2000) that is evidently 
embodied in EU engagement is often confronted with manifold practices of 
resistance. Yet by focusing on the ‘banality of day-to-day work’ (cf. Merlingen & 
Ostrauskaite 2006) it is able to refashion and mould local capacities for action 
with a view to making the conduct of locals more consistent with EU objectives 
and best practice. This will become clearer in the detailed discussion below of the 
two missions and their respective take on the transition process. To do this I focus 
on certain modes of operational conduct, employed by EU officials that support 
their quest to transform local governance structures in an improving direction. 
Before embarking on the discussion, two perspectives have to be born in mind. 
Firstly, that existing local structures prior to EU involvement are by definition 
regarded as inferior and that secondly therefore, ‘improving direction’ and 
‘European best practice’ are synonymous in the eyes of the EU. 
 
 Security Sector Reform 
 
No issue is more important for the DRC’s prospects in peace and development, 
than security sector reform. At the same time it is the most difficult challenge. 
The country has been divided by years of war, mismanagement and corruption 
leaving little in the way of a coherent force behind. For years, even decades, the 
army, and to a lesser degree the police did not exist to provide security for the 
public, but were essentially predatory organs of state repression used by 
politicians and officers to pursue individual political aims and economic goals. 
This often went hand in hand with grave human rights abuses against the civilian 
population. 
In many cases, soldiers are not paid and hence have to resort to begging and 
extortion on the civilian populations amidst whom they are based, making them 
the number one human rights abuser in the country. As a result, insecurity is 
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prevalent throughout most of the country, even today as the transition process 
officially ended with the assumption of power by the new democratically elected 
government of Joseph Kabila in December 2006. Especially the eastern provinces 
of North and South Kivu and the Ituri District (see Map) remain marred by 
lawlessness and insecurity as a result of army action (IRIN 2007). With the 
population destitute and exposed to high rates of criminal violence perpetrated by 
Congolese and non-Congolese groups20, mortality rates remain staggeringly high. 
Real control over the security structures rests with the ex-belligerents who 
made up the transitional government and include various ruthless ex-militias. 
Their training consisted of little more than basic infantry drills and the firing of an 
AK-47 (ICG 2006a). 
As a result creating a unified army under civilian command and an 
independent police force is the number one issue of importance. Transforming 
military and police structures is an inherently politically challenging process even 
in the best of environments. For purposes of definition, such reforms can be seen 
as addressing the core issues of how the security system is structured, regulated, 
managed, resourced and controlled within the three main branches: the military, 
police and judiciary.21 At the same time, as the ICG (2006a) lamented, “while the 
international community spent over $2 billion in the Congo for 2005, the largest 
part went to health care, education and transport. Moreover, funding for security 
reform has largely concentrated on providing demobilisation packages rather than 
building up the army and police”, to become “modern and professional”.  
The EU’s involvement provides, in many ways, this missing link. Although 
small in size, it has positioned itself well in key areas: provision of training and 
subsequent monitoring, mentoring and advice. The EU’s Security Sector Reform 
Strategy represents a new approach that addresses the intertwined challenges of 
development, security and governance outlined above. 
 
 EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo 
 
EUPOL Kinshasa was set up in December 2004, by the Political and Security 
Committee to provide a framework for and advice to the Integrated Police Unit 
(IPU). The ESDP mission was preceded by a phase, during which the EU 
supported the IPU in rehabilitating a training centre, providing basic equipment, 
and training police forces. The European Commission led these activities, and 
they were funded through the EDF whereas the Member States offered equipment 
and 18 experts.  
                                                 
20 For example, one of the biggest threats to security and stability is Rwandan Rebel group Forces 
Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), formerly Alliance pour la Libération du 
Rwanda (ALiR). Largely made up of Interahamwe and the former Rwandan army who perpetrated 
the genocide in 1994, the FDLR is estimated to number between 8,000 and 10,000 fighters (see 
ICG 2003) 
21 Incidentally, this is also the definition used by the EU. 
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The IPU is the subject of a project whose aim is to train 1008 Congolese 
police. Starting from 14 June 2005 with the deployment of mobile units in 
Kinshasa, the IPU has since been providing eight patrols a day in the city 
(Martinelli 2006). The objective is to scale up the neutral force currently made 
available by MONUC to guarantee the security of the government and transition 
institutions. The seconded officers are co-located to different sections of the IPU 
chain of command in order to “guarantee that the actions of the IPU are in line 
with international police best practices” (Council 2005b). Furthermore, the 
EUPOL mandate is to provide cooperation with international and local partners. 
While the scope and resources of EUPOL Kinshasa are significantly smaller 
than those of other European civilian police missions, in Bosnia and Macedonia,22 
it is novel from a conceptual point of view. Unlike in Bosnia and Macedonia, the 
mission operates within the framework of EU-UN cooperation in crisis 
management, as envisaged in the Joint Declaration of September 2003. Unlike 
Bosnia and Macedonia where the EU took over after the UN left, EUPOL 
Kinshasa is, therefore a ‘test operation’ of sorts to demonstrate that the EU can 
contribute effectively within a UN-led complex operations environment. 
While slightly different in mandate, EUSEC RD Congo’s mission works 
similarly. It provides advice and assistance to Congolese authorities in charge of 
security “while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with 
human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles 
of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. 
Again, its officers are assigned to various key posts within the Congolese 
administration, including the office of the Defence Minister, CONADER and the 
Joint Operations Committee.  
Both missions hence deliberately ‘use’ local staff with strategic and tactical 
responsibilities to pursue the European ‘ideals’. Using co-location these missions 
exercise power over local structures without physical violence or material 
constraints, namely through the use of, what Michel Foucault (1991) calls, 
hierarchical observations, normalising judgements and corrections. Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaité (2006) have authoritatively shown how EU Police missions use a 
three-pronged strategy that approximates Foucault’s observation closely. Firstly, 
the missions observe what local officials do on a micro-level and report it up the 
chain of command from a somewhat removed perspective. Then, secondly, the 
information is evaluated with a view to pointing out all that is insufficient from a 
“best European practice” perspective. They thereby, thirdly, point out the 
inferiority of local work, which in itself becomes a powerful mechanism for 
instilling reform in the subject, premised on good deal of ‘pointing and shaming’ 
(cf. Martinelli 2006). 
An excellent example of how this approach works in practice is the Chain of 
Payments project that was pioneered by EUSEC in late 2005. As noted, most of 
the FARDC’s problems relate to political interference and above all rampant 
corruption. As mentioned before, army soldiers often are not paid, because the 
                                                 
22 For example, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia employs 500 officers, a vast mandate that 
includes fighting organised crime and an annual budget of €38 million. 
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money earmarked for them is siphoned off somewhere along the command chain 
and army commanders widely inflate the numbers of soldiers under their 
command to gain political influence and to ensure more money is coming in their 
direction. EUSEC, as well as a number of other donors, had long observed and 
lamented this rotten state of affairs. The EUSEC put forward a plan that solves 
many of these problems, and was finally endorsed by the Congolese authorities at 
the end of 2005. Under the project the chain of payments, in effect the money 
flow of the FARDC is separated from the chain of command. Instead, it offers a 
comprehensive framework for disbursing funds via especially co-located 
international experts at a brigade level. As the ICG approvingly notes, “this 
should reduce corruption in the army, ensure that soldiers are paid and train the 
Congolese in administrative procedures” (ICG 2006a:18). 
While the project is technical in nature, it is of course highly politically 
sensitive for the Congolese, signifying, in essence, the involvement of foreign 
actors in a basic sovereign state function. Because of this, this project is one of 
EUSEC’s greatest contributions to the whole of the army integration process, and 
by extension to the stability of the DRC. Costing only €7 million the project has 
managed to exert significant influence and maximum effect. As a result of the 
intimate knowledge the EU obtains this way, EUSEC has become “the best 
informed security sector reform institution in the Congo” (ICG 2006a:20).  
Furthermore, micro-engagement in the day-to-day processes of army reform 
has proven to be the most effective measure to ensure reform enhancing the EU’s 
ability to constrain locals according to a clear set of preconceived rules of 
procedures and best practice. In this regard, micro-engagement should not be 
misunderstood as micromanagement. While the latter is often associated with a 
failure to delegate and ‘getting lost in details’, the characteristic feature of micro-
engagement is that while these missions immerse themselves in the details of 
local (reform implementation) work, enable a strategic view on the capabilities, 
shortcomings and problems. 
While the above discussion has mainly focused on the use of co-location as a 
political ‘technology’ to affect sustainable change, another, albeit closely linked 
way to promote change is through clear ideas of professionalism. Based on 
notions of objective behaviour, professionalism in the European sense is 
conspicuously absent from all of the services charged with the security of the 
country. Again, professionalisation, as well as co-location, focuses on the conduct 
of police officers, security agents, army personnel and administrative officials. In 
order to achieve the level of ‘pedagogical development’ that is needed amongst its 
pupils (‘the locals’) for the change to be self-sustainable, these have to be 
mentored in a way that stresses the two basic characteristics of professionalism: a 
sense of responsibility for the societies that they are supposed to serve, and an 
ability to resist inappropriate political meddling. This is done through inducting 
trainees in skills that (foreign) expert know. Drawing on a certain practical 
knowledge, trainers tutor inductees in what the, as educators, consider the best 
way to carry out certain tasks. The trainees are thereby forced to revaluate their 
professional world along European lines of understanding. At the same time they 
are instilled with a sense of responsibility for the job they are doing and a sense of 
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pride in their place within it. Both EUPOL, and to a lesser EUSEC have engaged 
their counterparts in similar ways, focusing on upgrading their professionalism. 
 
3.2.4 Evaluating Civilian ESDP involvement 
 
Civilian capabilities, as it were, were of course initially created to mediate against 
the military dimension of the evolving ESDP. They have thus been able to 
maintain a discourse of ‘civilian power’, permitting the EU to present these new 
capabilities as a ‘holistic’ approach to security. Moreover, the equilibrium 
between the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ components of the embryonic European security 
policy was and is incessantly re-evaluated taking in the ‘lessons learnt’ in the field 
of crisis management and post-conflict peace-building. 
The deployment of civilian instruments in the DRC, as in Balkans beforehand, 
therefore, illustrates perfectly the discourse on the will to deploy in key regions 
with the whole toolbox of capabilities. In many ways, their deployment is a sign 
of the importance the Union affords to this region, incorporating them into a 
wider regional strategy. This approach combines the use of political dialogue 
within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (Art 8),23 the employment of 
Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region (EUSR), Aldo Ajello, 
community instruments such as development aid (EDF), humanitarian aid and 
emergency relief and financial support to civil society organisations, and finally 
the deployment of said civil-military missions EUPOL, EUSEC and Operation 
Artemis (cf. Council 2005c). This approach enables the Union to play a 
significant role within the DRC through the development and engagement of a 
whole variety of instruments that all, in one way or another target the security-
development nexus. 
Operation Artemis aimed to secure the town of Bunia for a short period of 
time, to stop ethnic violence and allow MONUC to reinforce. Contrary the 
civilian missions EUPOL and EUSEC contribute in a much more durable way to 
the security of the post-conflict period in the whole of the DRC24 and legitimise 
the European presence as a whole.  
It may be too early to judge the success of EUSEC and EUPOL, but by 
conceptualising their work as essentially an exercise in micro-engagement 
designed to educate and control their strengths are displayed. By focusing in 
strategic positions along the command line, systemic change in the way of 
accountability and professional conduct (which in itself is a precondition for 
accountability) is attempted that is in many ways novel compared to the other 
various ways in which the international community is trying to help the transition 
process along. Indeed this ‘European approach’ if I may call it that at this point 
has the advantage that is enables EU peacebuilders to affect the conduct in the 
                                                 
23 The Head of Missions of EUPOL and EUSEC, Superintendent Adilio Custodio and General 
Pierre Joanna respectively, have already been tasked to propose an effective framework for these 
dialogues to take place (Council 2007). 
24 Although strictly speaking EUPOL efforts are restricted to the capital Kinshasa. 
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long-run, and by extension the evolution of the way in which security services 
work. While it may be early to judge it is not entirely unrealistic to suggest that 
EU efforts are able to instil the self-sustainable characteristics, without having to 
submit them to “continuous surveillance” (Merlingen & Ostrauskaité 2006:109). 
Furthermore, the European preoccupation with fighting corruption as a means 
to effect lasting security sector reform is evidenced by both missions (FARDC 
and IPU). This approach is novel in the sense that it has not been pursued by the 
international community. So far it has remained a demandeur of anti-corruption 
efforts by local authorities rather than engaging itself in the process. Even if both 
missions’ mandate is limited, they show the Unions willingness to involve itself 
on the basis of an assessment of local needs and realities. 
In conclusion, it is worth spelling out a key questions that has implicitly guided 
the analysis, vis á vis the objective reasons for the Unions’ engagement: is it 
looking to create better ways to conduct local administrative business or a change 
in the mentality towards more transparency and accountability? Or to put it 
differently: Is the basis for involvement the creation of local capabilities or their 
civilisation? The official political declarations do not provide a definitive answer 
to this question. But it appears that the Unions attempts to wholeheartedly attack 
the question of corruption and that this will implicitly and explicitly lead to a 
redefinition of what is acceptable and what not. In this regard, the European 
approach offers to add significant breadth to a developing international approach 
to peace-building, by refocusing on the development of more transparent and 
responsible administration of essential state services.  
The objective of EUPOL and EUSEC is not to regulate all internal problems of 
security reform and corruption, or to substitute the local ownership, to quote a 
buzzword from the development community, of state administration. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that EUPOL, for example, is not invested in defining the 
priorities for the police forces, but its engagement offers the instruments for a 
lasting change in their behaviour and the legitimate use of force. The reason is to 
securitise the transition and anchor and legitimise the European presence in the 
long-term. As Merlingen and Ostrauskaité have noted with reference to European 
police missions, this is done through the “recreation, reformation and 
restructuring of indigenous police forces and the wider justice system of which 
they are an organic part” (2005:215) through the alignment of social security 
practices with European best practice. These aspects allow for the establishment 
of the basis upon which the crucial communication between the security forces 
and the civilian population can emerge. That, in many ways is the European 
contribution to the concept of local ownership. 
Thanks to EUPOL and EUSEC, the Union has been able to undeniably 
reinforce the coherence of its actions in the DRC and the legitimacy of its 
presence in the eyes of local actors and other international donors. It has also been 
able to advance some of the assignments of MONUC’s mandate. The UN mission 
shall, in effect: “contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the 
institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the 
integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility and assist 
the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas”. 
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Furthermore, MONUC’s mandate includes “Security sector reform, including the 
integration of national defence and internal security forces together with 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and, in particular, the training and 
monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN 2004a). The EU decision to 
assume an important role in the formation of the IPU, through the training, advice 
and strategic direction provided by EUPOL, therefore substantially aids MONUC 
to fulfil its mandate, while enabling the Union to benefit from the considerable 
experience of the Blue-helmets.25 
 
 
                                                 
25 Mutual liaison between the EU and MONUC on matters of security sector reform are regarded 
as crucial to donor coordination and the spreading of experience. Coordination also includes 
working-relations between the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Council 
Secretariat. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Learning from the Past 
 
 
If the peace-building record of the 1990s demonstrated anything, it was that there 
is no easy, quick and cheap method of establishing stable and lasting peace in 
war-shattered states. The experience in the Balkans serves as a prime example for 
this. Had international involvement in Bosnia focused on the difficult task of 
building an effective state-structure in the relatively early part of its mandate the 
exercise in stabilising Bosnia in the long-run might be further along than it is 
now, twelve years after the Dayton Agreement (cf. Paris 2004). 
Rebuilding effective governmental institutions, managing a phased and gradual 
transition to peaceful market democracy is fundamentally important. Equally, 
ensuring that the rule of law is sufficiently strong to defend the new state against 
challenges requires a concerted effort not only to strengthen the capacity of the 
police and armed forces, but to ensure their actions are in accordance with good 
practice, whether European or other, and are mandated by a sufficiently 
functioning, independent judiciary. 
This requires extensive involvement by the international community; both 
concerning the length of the engagement and the extent thereof. Peacebuilders 
should not fool themselves to the thought that following the relatively successful 
elections of last year, international involvement will or should be coming to a 
quick end, particularly in conflict-prone and under-institutionalised countries. As 
successfully executed as they were, the fundamental problems the Congo faces 
have remained. In essence, the international community has to be a community of, 
to borrow from Roland Paris, “surrogate governing authorities” (2004:206).  
 
 
4.2 Adding Value to Peace-building Trusteeship 
 
 
The key concern with any outside involvement in security sector reform is the 
sustainability of the change that has been affected once foreign personnel leaves. 
The projects that where incorporated at the behest of Europeans, especially the 
sensitive Chain of Payments project, certainly cannot entirely escape this logic. 
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What hinders army commanders and local politicians from undoing the successful 
good governance projects and simply falling back into their old ways of nepotism, 
corruption and official extortion, once European governments decide to turn their 
attention away from the Congo? 
In many ways, the short answer is not much. It would be foolish to suggest 
outside involvement, weather European or not, would be able to inflict cultural 
and behavioural change on a societal level that would in effect be nothing less 
than a revolution. But the vital contributions necessary to start a process of 
systemic change can be provided by a well thought through and executed mission. 
Merlingen and Ostrauskaité have noted a similar problematique with regards to 
what they term police aid lite (sic): “Without re-imagining the state-policing 
nexus in a way that opens up space in which organizational forms of policing that 
balance the pursuit of security with the pursuit of a participatory policing style 
can flourish, ESDP police aid cannot hope to ensure a smooth transition from 
crisis management and post-crisis stabilization to a longer-term re-engineering of 
police organization and cultures” (2005:234). 
The actions of the EU missions are, viewed in this way, much more than the 
‘technical assistance’ so decried for its deficiencies in dealing with the DRC’s 
problems. The EU is able to provide a holistic, all encompassing strategy for 
security sector reform that is in this intensity and form unavailable anywhere else 
in the ‘toolbox’ of the international community. Despite criticism, the new 
security sector reform strategy pioneered here and elsewhere (notably in Bosnia 
and Macedonia), provides the EU with an explicit framework within which one 
can address causes of instability that threaten the recurrence of violence in states 
emerging from violent conflict. The work in the DRC illustrates this par 
excellence.  
This paper has focused in large parts on what I call micro-engagement. This 
micro-engagement is always meant as a positive attribute of an approach to 
international peace-building efforts that originated in the halls of the UN and is 
carried, hopefully, to its logical conclusion by the international community, chief 
among them the EU. Indeed, I have argued that the Union has been the actor best 
able and willing to employ such “pastoral power” (Merlingen & Ostrauskaité 
2006). 
As a result the international community is, in the case of the DRC, as in other 
cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and possibly Iraq drawn towards what 
James Fearon and David Laitin (2004) refer to as neo-trusteeship26, or more 
provocatively, post-modern imperialism. The character of much of the European 
involvement, as exemplified in the Congo, certainly pushes the widely accepted 
notions of peace-building further in this direction. Involving a remarkable degree 
                                                 
26 The choice of words employed by Fearon and Laitin is a reference to the, now obsolete, UN 
Trusteeship Council, that was set up to assign administrative responsibilities to particular states 
(Art 73 of UN Charter). With the rise of the decolonialisation movement in the 1950s and 60s, the 
trusteeship system came under increasing pressure and the Council suspended its operations 
finally in 1994, although it most territories were released into self-government or became part of 
other countries long before that. 
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of power over key domestic political developments such involvement risks being 
labelled neo-imperialist.  
The end of the Cold War removed the mask of quasi-stability and opened the 
view to a new understanding of politico-developmental security. Especially in 
Africa where governance structures are often corrupt, underdeveloped and weak 
do we witness a high number of violent conflicts. The strong relationship between 
the failure of institutions and ‘failure of peace’ has been pointed out in a number 
of studies (cf. Collier 2003; Esty et al 1998). Hence, it is necessary for the 
international community to realise the civilising potential of civil-military micro-
engagement in post-conflict environments to help them escape the conflict trap 
(cf. ICG 2006b). Weather or not the ‘imperialism’-label applies to this new sort of 
commitment is not important to the essence of this thesis. The ‘i-word’ certainly 
carries too many negative connotations to qualify as an adequate description of 
what is happening. Indeed, the raison d’être of such peace-building engagement 
is not a continuation of colonialism but instead an attempt to restore the effective 
sovereignty of war-shattered states by working to create conditions under which 
these states could govern themselves independently and peacefully. The DRC 
certainly descend back into chaos, were the international community to decide to 
leave. 
That said, the micro-engagement strategy being devised by the EU, in 
coordination with the other relevant international peace-building actors, does 
represent a form of control over a state that has proven unable to self-govern. In 
this sense, it may certainly be viewed as a form of neo-trusteeship, with the small 
difference that the situation today is one of multilateral donor governance, rather 
than a system of management by a single state or singular authority. In any case, 
this type of neo-trusteeship has historically proven paramount to prevent the 
recurrence of civil and ethnic conflict that devastates livelihoods and potentially 
threatens regional and international security. There may be no other way. 
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